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Conclusions of Senate Subcommittee Report on Billy Carter's Ties With Libya

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WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 — Following is the conclusions chapter of the special Senate subcommittee's report today on its investigation of Billy Carter's relationship to Libya:

It has been an objective of the subcommittee to agree on a set of conclusions. While there will be a number of additional statements, the members of the subcommittee agree to the following:

Libyan officials went to considerable trouble and expense in establishing and maintaining a relationship with Billy Carter. The initial contact was the result of persistent efforts and a devious series of personal contacts aided by the participation of an important Libyan official. The relationship was then cultivated not only through personal participation by important Libyan officials and expense-paid trips but by holding out the prospect of a highly lucrative oil commission arrangement and a large loan, as well as the actual transfers of large sums of money.

The Libyan plan to establish a relationship with Billy Carter may have received its original impetus from the Libyan program aimed at influencing U.S. policy through people-to-people contacts, which is described earlier in this report. Enlisting Billy Carter as a spokesman supportive of Libya and its policies and conduct might have been viewed as aid to Libya's public relations effort. Billy Carter's usefulness for this purpose soon ended, however, and surely did not extend beyond early 1979, when it became apparent that he would not be effective as a salesman of the Libyan cause to the American people. Other purposes must have remained, because the remarkable relationship between important Libyan officials and the brother of the President of the United States continued, and the Libyans eventually conferred substantial pecuniary benefits upon him and

held out to him the possibility of even greater financial rewards.

To a large degree the other possible Libyan purposes must be left to inference. Among the diverse advantages the relationship may have provided for the Libyans were an avenue by which communications between them and the President might be facilitated should the opportunity and need arise, a means of embarrassing the United States or the President at an opportune time, and, perhaps, opportunities to obtain through friendly conversations with Billy Carter insights into the personality of the President. We can assume with some assurance that the Libyan purpose in creating and maintaining the relationship was to benefit the Libyan Government and Libyan policy.

The subcommittee believes that operation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act in this instance served the valid objective of requiring public disclosure. The Department of Justice correctly rejected the view that Billy Carter's oil commission arrangement with the Charter Crude Oil Company was an ordinary commercial arrangement. Rather, the arrangement with Charter was the basis for a benefit which the Libyan Government could bestow on Billy Carter whenever Libya concluded that its need would thereby be served. The subcommittee also believes that the payments totaling \$220,000 by Libya to Billy Carter are additional indicia of the influence or control by Libya over him. This is so whether the payments are viewed as compensation for services rendered or to be rendered by Billy Carter for Libya, or as a major financial obligation which Billy Carter must satisfy to a nation whose interests are often inimical to ours.

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